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fix(backups): restrict the kafka-metadata CLI Pod and correct demo personas - #4695

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fix/kafka-demo-persona-and-podsecurity
Oct 5, 2026
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IvanHunters merged 2 commits into
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fix/kafka-demo-persona-and-podsecurity

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@lexfrei

@lexfrei Aleksei Sviridkin (lexfrei) commented Oct 2, 2026 •

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What this PR does

This fixes two problems in the Kafka and NATS backup demos under examples/backups/.

The Kafka metadata demo ran its CLI Pod without any securityContext, so a namespace that enforces the restricted Pod Security level would reject it. The Pod now gets the same restricted context as the CLI Pod in the topic-data demo: runAsNonRoot, the RuntimeDefault seccomp profile, no privilege escalation, all capabilities dropped. The new bats case reads the overrides passed to kubectl run and fails if any of those fields is missing or the patch is not sent as --override-type=json. It is red on main, and it goes red on each of seven single-field mutations of the patch while the other five cases stay green.

One known limit: runAsNonRoot needs an image that runs as a non-root user. The default Strimzi image runs as UID 1001 and is fine. If KAFKA_IMAGE is overridden with an image that runs as root, the kubelet refuses to start the container, and the helper fails only when its 5 minute kubectl wait times out.

The kafka and nats walkthroughs told a tenant to run scripts that the tenant roles forbid. Steps 03, 04, 06, 07 and cleanup.sh were in the tenant column, and the scenario docs and several script comments had the tenant create the backup Secret. Those rows now say admin and name the part a tenant admin can do on its own, and the scenario docs say the same. After this change the persona column in both tables matches the tenant roles. kafka-metadata has no persona table, so I didn't change anything there.

These are the tenant rules on pods and backup objects, plus one example of the per-app secret rules. Each app chart's dashboard Role allows get, list and watch on a few named Secrets and no other verb on secrets. Nothing aggregated into the tenant roles grants pods/exec, pods/log, helmreleases, objectstorage.k8s.io, statefulsets or kafkas.kafka.strimzi.io.

# packages/system/cozystack-basics/templates/clusterroles.yaml:100-112 (cozy:tenant:view:base, every tenant level)
- apiGroups:
  - ""
  resources:
  - pods
  - services
  - persistentvolumes
  - endpoints
  - events
  - resourcequotas
  verbs:
  - get
  - list
  - watch
# packages/system/cozystack-basics/templates/clusterroles.yaml:238-246 (cozy:tenant:admin:base)
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources:
  - pods
  - services
  - persistentvolumes
  - endpoints
  - events
  verbs:
  - delete
# packages/system/backup-controller/templates/tenant-clusterroles.yaml:35-44 (cozy:backups:admin)
- apiGroups: ["backups.cozystack.io"]
  resources:
  - plans
  - backupjobs
  - restorejobs
  verbs:
  - create
  - update
  - patch
  - delete
# packages/apps/bucket/templates/dashboard-resourcemap.yaml:6-14 (bound at the tenant "use" level)
- apiGroups:
  - ""
  resources:
  - secrets
  resourceNames:
  {{- range $name, $user := .Values.users }}
  - {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $name }}-credentials
  {{- end }}
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]

How each changed row runs into those rules:

Row What the script needs Why a tenant can't
03 (kafka, nats) waits on the HelmRelease and COSI objects, get on the bucket-<name>-backup Secret, kafka also reads the CA Secret in tenant-root no helmreleases or objectstorage.k8s.io rule; the bucket Role covers only <release>-<user>-credentials
04 (kafka, nats) waits on the HelmRelease and the Strimzi Kafka or the StatefulSet, create on secrets, create on pods, pods/exec pods are get/list/watch/delete only, and nothing grants create on secrets
06 (kafka, nats) create on pods and pods/exec for the CLI Pod, kafka also get on pods/log for the refused restore same pod rules, and nothing grants pods/log
07 (kafka, nats) same as 04 same as 04
cleanup.sh (kafka, nats) delete on secrets, on backups, and on the cluster-scoped BackupClass and strategy cozy:backups:admin deletes only plans, backupjobs and restorejobs, and no tenant rule covers secrets or cluster-scoped objects

Step 05 stays a tenant step. Its BackupJob comes from cozy:backups:admin, so in practice that means a tenant admin. The nats demo's CLI Pod has the same missing securityContext as the kafka-metadata one, and I left it for a separate issue.

Closes #4625

Closes #4636

Screenshots

Not a UI change.

Downstream repositories

Release note

fix(backups): the kafka-metadata backup demo now runs its CLI Pod with the restricted Pod Security context, and the kafka and nats backup demos now list steps 03, 04, 06, 07 and cleanup as admin steps, because they need Pod, exec, Secret and cluster-scoped permissions that tenant roles do not grant.

Summary by CodeRabbit

  • Security
    • Kafka metadata backup CLI Pods are recreated with restricted security settings when they are not running or lack the required non-root configuration.
  • Documentation
    • Kafka and NATS guides clarify which setup, restore, and cleanup steps require administrator access and which job actions tenants can perform.
    • Updated examples clarify that the demo provides required storage Secrets and certificates.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added area/storage Issues or PRs related to storage (linstor, seaweedfs, bucket, velero, harbor) kind/bug Categorizes issue or PR as related to a bug size/M This PR changes 30-99 lines, ignoring generated files labels Oct 2, 2026
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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The Kafka metadata CLI Pod helper checks for non-root execution and applies restricted security settings when it creates a Pod. The Kafka and NATS backup walkthroughs clarify which steps require admin access and who provides the required Secrets.

Changes

Kafka metadata CLI Pod security

Layer / File(s) Summary
Restrict CLI Pod creation
examples/backups/kafka-metadata/00-helpers.sh, hack/kafka-metadata-backup-demo-helpers.bats
The helper recreates owned Pods that do not have runAsNonRoot: true. New Pods use RuntimeDefault seccomp, disabled privilege escalation, and dropped capabilities. Bats tests check the overrides and recreation behavior.

Kafka and NATS walkthrough access requirements

Layer / File(s) Summary
Clarify Secret ownership and step access
examples/backups/kafka/*, examples/backups/nats/*
Comments identify demo-provided Secrets. The walkthroughs distinguish tenant job actions from scripted steps that require admin access. The README tables mark the affected setup, restore, and cleanup steps as admin-only.

Priority: ➖ Normal

Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes

Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: Medium

Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to d1368

An existing Kafka metadata demo Pod may still be reused without the full restricted profile. The risk is limited to that demo workflow, but its owner should accept or address it before merging.

Security Architecture Review

Security architecture risk: 🔵 Low · up to d1368

The change reduces CLI Pod privileges and corrects guidance without granting tenants additional authority. No introduced security vulnerability was established. Remaining uncertainty concerns concurrent Pod replacement, reuse of externally created Pods, and compatibility of custom images with non-root execution.

Retained concerns
No architecture-level concerns identified.

Security review details

Security Blast Radius

  • inferred — The direct runtime effect is on the configured CLI Pod in NAMESPACE and its seed or verification operations against Kafka. Executing these operations requires the caller's existing Kubernetes permissions. The change does not itself grant authority across tenants, services, or data stores.

Security Findings and Attack Paths

  • inferred — Independent Pod reads and name-based deletion permit interleavings with another Pod writer or concurrent caller. Exact base source shows that this ownership race predates the PR. Head expands replacement eligibility, but the reviewed evidence does not establish a new lower-privilege attack path or materially broader exposure.

Trust Boundaries and Controls

  • observed — A present Pod without the expected demo label is refused, and lookup failures stop execution. The label is an ownership convention, not authenticated provenance. Reuse checks only Pod-level runAsNonRoot; it does not independently validate the remaining restricted fields. Such partially configured Pods were also reusable in base.

Resilience and Maintainability Implications

  • inferred — A custom image that requires root can remain Pending and time out under runAsNonRoot. A retry may reuse that Pending Pod rather than recreate it. This is fail-closed availability loss, not fallback to a weaker security context; image compatibility was not runtime-verified.

Hardening Proposals

  • proposed — If this helper is used in shared or concurrent automation, validate the complete effective security profile before reuse and coordinate replacement with Pod identity preconditions or serialization. These strengthen existing ownership assumptions; they are not verified vulnerabilities introduced by this PR.
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name Status Explanation Resolution
Docstring Coverage ⚠️ Warning Docstring coverage is 50.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 4 functions across 8 files. Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Description Check ✅ Passed Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check ✅ Passed The title clearly summarizes both main changes: restricting the Kafka-metadata CLI Pod and correcting backup demo persona guidance.
Linked Issues check ✅ Passed [#4625] The Kafka README now marks steps 04, 06, and 07 as admin steps. It also corrects related Secret, bucket, and cleanup guidance. The Kafka and NATS scenario documents identify admin-only CLI Pod…
Out of Scope Changes check ✅ Passed The Kafka-metadata helper and bats changes implement [#4636]. The Kafka and NATS README, scenario, and comment changes support the persona and permission corrections in [#4625]. The summary shows no u…
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@lexfrei
Aleksei Sviridkin (lexfrei) force-pushed the fix/kafka-demo-persona-and-podsecurity branch from bde04ea to 098ba96 Compare October 2, 2026 02:52
@github-actions github-actions Bot added size/L This PR changes 100-499 lines, ignoring generated files and removed size/M This PR changes 30-99 lines, ignoring generated files labels Oct 2, 2026

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Actionable comments posted: 1


  • 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @examples/backups/kafka-metadata/00-helpers.sh:
- Around line 159-176: Update kafka_cli_pod to validate the required Pod- and
container-level security settings before reusing an owned Running or Pending
Pod. Recreate the owned Pod when any required setting is absent or incorrect,
while preserving the existing ownership check and reuse behavior for compliant
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  • examples/backups/kafka-metadata/00-helpers.sh
  • examples/backups/kafka/00-helpers.sh
  • examples/backups/kafka/01-create-strategy.sh
  • examples/backups/kafka/03-create-bucket.sh
  • examples/backups/kafka/90-scenario-admin-prepare.md
  • examples/backups/kafka/91-scenario-user-backup.md
  • examples/backups/kafka/92-scenario-user-restore.md
  • examples/backups/kafka/README.md
  • examples/backups/nats/00-helpers.sh
  • examples/backups/nats/01-create-strategy.sh
  • examples/backups/nats/03-create-bucket.sh
  • examples/backups/nats/90-scenario-admin-prepare.md
  • examples/backups/nats/91-scenario-user-backup.md
  • examples/backups/nats/92-scenario-user-restore.md
  • examples/backups/nats/README.md
  • hack/kafka-metadata-backup-demo-helpers.bats

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Comment thread examples/backups/kafka-metadata/00-helpers.sh Outdated
The kafka-metadata walkthrough started its long-lived CLI Pod with a
bare kubectl run, so the Pod carried no securityContext and a namespace
enforcing the restricted Pod Security level would reject it. The kafka
topic-data walkthrough already layers the restricted context onto its
CLI Pod; the metadata demo now applies the same JSON patch. A running
CLI Pod left by an earlier run without that context is replaced rather
than reused, since a Pod's securityContext cannot change in place.

The new bats cases read the overrides kubectl run receives and fail
unless both the Pod-level and the container-level fields are present
and the patch is sent as --override-type=json, and check that an owned
Pod without the restricted context is recreated.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <[email protected]>
The kafka and nats walkthroughs put steps 03, 04, 06, 07 and cleanup
under the tenant persona, and the scenario docs and helper comments
had the tenant create the backup Secret. The scripts read, create and
delete Secrets, wait on HelmReleases, COSI objects and operator
resources, exec into a CLI Pod, read Pod logs, and delete the Backup
and the cluster-scoped BackupClass and strategy. The tenant roles grant
none of that, so a tenant following the docs hit Forbidden at the
first read. The tables now say admin and name the part a tenant admin can
do on its own, and the scenario docs say the same.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <[email protected]>
@lexfrei
Aleksei Sviridkin (lexfrei) force-pushed the fix/kafka-demo-persona-and-podsecurity branch from d13683d to 534f8f1 Compare October 2, 2026 22:43
@IvanHunters
IvanHunters enabled auto-merge October 5, 2026 11:06

@IvanHunters IvanHunters left a comment

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LGTM

This fixes two real problems in the kafka-metadata and nats backup demos, and both fixes move in the safe direction. The CLI Pod change only tightens the Pod's security context, and the persona edits only correct documentation to match the RBAC that already exists. No RBAC is changed and nothing gains broader access.

What I checked:

The restricted context the kafka-metadata helper now applies is byte-identical to the one the kafka topic-data demo already ships (examples/backups/kafka/00-helpers.sh:160), the same --override-type=json patch and the same fields, so the two demos stay consistent. The recreation guard reads correctly: an absent Pod, a terminal-phase Pod, and a Pod that predates the restricted profile are deleted and recreated, a Ready Pod already under the profile is reused, and a same-named Pod the demo does not own is still refused before any read or delete. drop: ["ALL"] and runAsNonRoot do not affect the CLI's work (sleep infinity plus an exec'd kafka-topics.sh on the stock Strimzi image at UID 1001), so function is preserved. The one real limit, a KAFKA_IMAGE override that runs as root, is fail-closed (the Pod stays Pending and the 5-minute kubectl wait times out), and the PR body documents it.

The persona corrections are accurate. Against packages/system/cozystack-basics/templates/clusterroles.yaml and packages/system/backup-controller/templates/tenant-clusterroles.yaml, tenant roles grant pods get/list/watch (view) and delete (admin) but never create, pods/exec or pods/log, and grant no create on raw secrets, no helmreleases, objectstorage.k8s.io, statefulsets or kafkas.kafka.strimzi.io. So marking steps 03/04/06/07 and cleanup.sh as admin, while keeping the bare BackupJob/RestoreJob and the Bucket/Kafka/NATS creation as the tenant admin's part, matches reality. This is a documentation correction toward a stricter truth, not a loosening.

I merged current main into the branch and ran the backup demo bats suites on the merged tree: kafka-metadata, backup-access-preflight, backup-examples-shared-helpers, kafka-topic and nats all pass, so the new test and the changed stub sit correctly with what landed on main since the branch was cut.

Non-blocking:

  • The nats CLI Pod still has the same missing security context. You already call this out and defer it to a separate issue; noting only that it is tracked.
  • The new test uses jq, already assumed by many other hack/*.bats suites, so no new dependency.

@IvanHunters
IvanHunters merged commit 14eab3c into main Oct 5, 2026
20 checks passed
@IvanHunters
IvanHunters deleted the fix/kafka-demo-persona-and-podsecurity branch October 5, 2026 11:11
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