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fix(backups): restrict the kafka-metadata CLI Pod and correct demo personas - #4695
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Included review availability: This review used your included allowance. Your plan provides up to 8 included reviews per hour; 4 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe Kafka metadata CLI Pod helper checks for non-root execution and applies restricted security settings when it creates a Pod. The Kafka and NATS backup walkthroughs clarify which steps require admin access and who provides the required Secrets. ChangesKafka metadata CLI Pod security
Kafka and NATS walkthrough access requirements
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: Medium Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to An existing Kafka metadata demo Pod may still be reused without the full restricted profile. The risk is limited to that demo workflow, but its owner should accept or address it before merging. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🔵 Low · up to The change reduces CLI Pod privileges and corrects guidance without granting tenants additional authority. No introduced security vulnerability was established. Remaining uncertainty concerns concurrent Pod replacement, reuse of externally created Pods, and compatibility of custom images with non-root execution. Retained concerns Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @examples/backups/kafka-metadata/00-helpers.sh:
- Around line 159-176: Update kafka_cli_pod to validate the required Pod- and
container-level security settings before reusing an owned Running or Pending
Pod. Recreate the owned Pod when any required setting is absent or incorrect,
while preserving the existing ownership check and reuse behavior for compliant
Pods.
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📒 Files selected for processing (16)
examples/backups/kafka-metadata/00-helpers.shexamples/backups/kafka/00-helpers.shexamples/backups/kafka/01-create-strategy.shexamples/backups/kafka/03-create-bucket.shexamples/backups/kafka/90-scenario-admin-prepare.mdexamples/backups/kafka/91-scenario-user-backup.mdexamples/backups/kafka/92-scenario-user-restore.mdexamples/backups/kafka/README.mdexamples/backups/nats/00-helpers.shexamples/backups/nats/01-create-strategy.shexamples/backups/nats/03-create-bucket.shexamples/backups/nats/90-scenario-admin-prepare.mdexamples/backups/nats/91-scenario-user-backup.mdexamples/backups/nats/92-scenario-user-restore.mdexamples/backups/nats/README.mdhack/kafka-metadata-backup-demo-helpers.bats
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The kafka-metadata walkthrough started its long-lived CLI Pod with a bare kubectl run, so the Pod carried no securityContext and a namespace enforcing the restricted Pod Security level would reject it. The kafka topic-data walkthrough already layers the restricted context onto its CLI Pod; the metadata demo now applies the same JSON patch. A running CLI Pod left by an earlier run without that context is replaced rather than reused, since a Pod's securityContext cannot change in place. The new bats cases read the overrides kubectl run receives and fail unless both the Pod-level and the container-level fields are present and the patch is sent as --override-type=json, and check that an owned Pod without the restricted context is recreated. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <[email protected]>
The kafka and nats walkthroughs put steps 03, 04, 06, 07 and cleanup under the tenant persona, and the scenario docs and helper comments had the tenant create the backup Secret. The scripts read, create and delete Secrets, wait on HelmReleases, COSI objects and operator resources, exec into a CLI Pod, read Pod logs, and delete the Backup and the cluster-scoped BackupClass and strategy. The tenant roles grant none of that, so a tenant following the docs hit Forbidden at the first read. The tables now say admin and name the part a tenant admin can do on its own, and the scenario docs say the same. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <[email protected]>
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IvanHunters
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LGTM
This fixes two real problems in the kafka-metadata and nats backup demos, and both fixes move in the safe direction. The CLI Pod change only tightens the Pod's security context, and the persona edits only correct documentation to match the RBAC that already exists. No RBAC is changed and nothing gains broader access.
What I checked:
The restricted context the kafka-metadata helper now applies is byte-identical to the one the kafka topic-data demo already ships (examples/backups/kafka/00-helpers.sh:160), the same --override-type=json patch and the same fields, so the two demos stay consistent. The recreation guard reads correctly: an absent Pod, a terminal-phase Pod, and a Pod that predates the restricted profile are deleted and recreated, a Ready Pod already under the profile is reused, and a same-named Pod the demo does not own is still refused before any read or delete. drop: ["ALL"] and runAsNonRoot do not affect the CLI's work (sleep infinity plus an exec'd kafka-topics.sh on the stock Strimzi image at UID 1001), so function is preserved. The one real limit, a KAFKA_IMAGE override that runs as root, is fail-closed (the Pod stays Pending and the 5-minute kubectl wait times out), and the PR body documents it.
The persona corrections are accurate. Against packages/system/cozystack-basics/templates/clusterroles.yaml and packages/system/backup-controller/templates/tenant-clusterroles.yaml, tenant roles grant pods get/list/watch (view) and delete (admin) but never create, pods/exec or pods/log, and grant no create on raw secrets, no helmreleases, objectstorage.k8s.io, statefulsets or kafkas.kafka.strimzi.io. So marking steps 03/04/06/07 and cleanup.sh as admin, while keeping the bare BackupJob/RestoreJob and the Bucket/Kafka/NATS creation as the tenant admin's part, matches reality. This is a documentation correction toward a stricter truth, not a loosening.
I merged current main into the branch and ran the backup demo bats suites on the merged tree: kafka-metadata, backup-access-preflight, backup-examples-shared-helpers, kafka-topic and nats all pass, so the new test and the changed stub sit correctly with what landed on main since the branch was cut.
Non-blocking:
- The nats CLI Pod still has the same missing security context. You already call this out and defer it to a separate issue; noting only that it is tracked.
- The new test uses
jq, already assumed by many otherhack/*.batssuites, so no new dependency.
What this PR does
This fixes two problems in the Kafka and NATS backup demos under
examples/backups/.The Kafka metadata demo ran its CLI Pod without any securityContext, so a namespace that enforces the restricted Pod Security level would reject it. The Pod now gets the same restricted context as the CLI Pod in the topic-data demo:
runAsNonRoot, theRuntimeDefaultseccomp profile, no privilege escalation, all capabilities dropped. The new bats case reads the overrides passed tokubectl runand fails if any of those fields is missing or the patch is not sent as--override-type=json. It is red on main, and it goes red on each of seven single-field mutations of the patch while the other five cases stay green.One known limit:
runAsNonRootneeds an image that runs as a non-root user. The default Strimzi image runs as UID 1001 and is fine. IfKAFKA_IMAGEis overridden with an image that runs as root, the kubelet refuses to start the container, and the helper fails only when its 5 minutekubectl waittimes out.The kafka and nats walkthroughs told a tenant to run scripts that the tenant roles forbid. Steps 03, 04, 06, 07 and
cleanup.shwere in the tenant column, and the scenario docs and several script comments had the tenant create the backup Secret. Those rows now say admin and name the part a tenant admin can do on its own, and the scenario docs say the same. After this change the persona column in both tables matches the tenant roles. kafka-metadata has no persona table, so I didn't change anything there.These are the tenant rules on pods and backup objects, plus one example of the per-app secret rules. Each app chart's dashboard Role allows
get,listandwatchon a few named Secrets and no other verb on secrets. Nothing aggregated into the tenant roles grantspods/exec,pods/log,helmreleases,objectstorage.k8s.io,statefulsetsorkafkas.kafka.strimzi.io.How each changed row runs into those rules:
HelmReleaseand COSI objects,geton thebucket-<name>-backupSecret, kafka also reads the CA Secret intenant-roothelmreleasesorobjectstorage.k8s.iorule; the bucket Role covers only<release>-<user>-credentialsHelmReleaseand the StrimziKafkaor theStatefulSet,createonsecrets,createonpods,pods/execget/list/watch/deleteonly, and nothing grantscreateon secretscreateonpodsandpods/execfor the CLI Pod, kafka alsogetonpods/logfor the refused restorepods/logcleanup.sh(kafka, nats)deleteonsecrets, onbackups, and on the cluster-scopedBackupClassand strategycozy:backups:admindeletes only plans, backupjobs and restorejobs, and no tenant rule covers secrets or cluster-scoped objectsStep 05 stays a tenant step. Its
BackupJobcomes fromcozy:backups:admin, so in practice that means a tenant admin. The nats demo's CLI Pod has the same missing securityContext as the kafka-metadata one, and I left it for a separate issue.Closes #4625
Closes #4636
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