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Corruption in North Korea

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Corruption in North Korea occurs at one of the worst rates in the world.

North Korea is ranked 172 out of 180 countries in Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index. The 182 countries of the Index are scored on a scale of 0 ("highly corrupt") to 100 ('very clean") according to the perceived corruption in the public sector, and then ranked by their score. The country whose public sector is perceived to be the most honest is ranked first.[1] North Korea's 2025 ranking was based on a score of 15. For comparison with regional scores, the best score among those countries of the Asia Pacific region that appeared in the Index[Note 1] was 84, the average score was 45 and the worst score was 15.[3] For comparison with worldwide scores, the best score was 89 (ranked 1), the average score was 42, and the worst score was 9 (ranked 181, in a two-way tie).[4]

Strict rules and draconian punishments imposed by the regime, for example, against accessing foreign media or for modifying radio or television receivers to access foreign media, are commonly evaded by offering bribes to the police.[5] It has become less common for colleagues and family members of clandestine foreign media consumers to report them to the authorities.[6]

North Korea's state media admitted widespread corruption in North Korea, when laying out the accusations against Jang Song-thaek after his execution in December 2013. The statement mentions bribery, deviation of materials, selling resources and land, securing funds and squandering money for private use by organizations under his control.[7]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ↑ Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, Vietnam[2]

References

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  1. ↑ "The ABCs of the CPI: How the Corruption Perceptions Index is calculated". Transparency.org. 11 February 2025. Retrieved 10 June 2026.
  2. ↑ "Corruption Perceptions Index 2025: Global scores". Transparency.org. 10 February 2026. CPI 2025. Retrieved 10 June 2026.
  3. ↑ "Corruption Perceptions Index 2025: Stalling anti-corruption progress in Asia Pacific while public anger surges". Transparency.org. Berlin. 10 February 2026. Retrieved 10 June 2026.
  4. ↑ "Corruption Perceptions Index 2025: North Korea". Transparency.org. Retrieved 18 July 2026.
  5. ↑ Nat Kretchun; Jane Kim (10 May 2012). "A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing Media Environment" (PDF). InterMedia. Archived from the original (PDF) on 12 May 2012. Retrieved 10 May 2012. p. 23: It is worth noting that since the mid-2000s, legal restrictions against outside media consumption have actually become more stringent. However, this may be a reaction to the reality on the ground in which punishments for outside media consumption are enforced less often and less strictly than before. Under normal circumstances, security personnel now often choose to take a bribe to overlook illegal media behaviors or the possession of illegal media goods.
  6. ↑ Nat Kretchun; Jane Kim (10 May 2012). "A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing Media Environment" (PDF). InterMedia. Archived from the original (PDF) on 12 May 2012. Retrieved 10 May 2012. p. 23: Another important dynamic that has allowed for a greater degree of opening in the media environment is a significant drop in the amount of people reporting on each other. While North Koreans who access outside media must still be wary of inspection teams dispatched to search for evidence of such behaviors, fewer citizens appear to be reporting on each other. Many North Koreans had to conceal their illegal behaviors from even their own families, as stories of children reporting on parents and spouses reporting on each other for illegal behaviors were common. Recently, however, it appears that the reach of the state no longer extends as much into the closest social bonds.
  7. ↑ "What North Korea Said About Jang Song Thaek". The Wall Street Journal. 13 December 2013. Retrieved 17 December 2013.
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