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fix: suppress phpcs false-positives in database-check (closes #122) - #200
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…122) When this issue was filed, database-check.php had real SQL-injection exposure (unescaped \$where_clauses concatenated into the query). The file has since been refactored — all dynamic SQL now goes through \$wpdb->prepare() with %s placeholders, and the variables passed to prepare() are either literal pattern strings or \$wpdb->esc_like()'d constants. No user input ever touches the query string directly. What remained were three phpcs false-positives: 1. WordPress.DB.PreparedSQLPlaceholders.UnfinishedPrepare (line 306) The WHERE clause is built from literal "option_value LIKE %s" fragments in a fixed-size loop. phpcs can't trace through implode + variadic spread to verify that the %s count matches ...\$values. 2. WordPress.DB.SlowDBQuery.slow_db_query_meta_key (line 515 SELECT) This is a security audit that intentionally scans usermeta for injected payloads. Slowness is the trade-off; LIMIT 50 + admin-only permission_callback keep blast radius small. Caching skipped on purpose — stale results would hide a fresh injection. 3. WordPress.DB.SlowDBQuery.slow_db_query_meta_key (line 531 array key) phpcs flags the PHP array key 'meta_key' as if it were a WP_Query argument. Same rule, false positive on a literal string key. Each suppression has a rationale comment explaining why. No behavior change — the SQL was already safe. Tests: 96 passing, unchanged. PHP lint: clean (0 errors, 0 warnings, was 0 errors / 2 warnings). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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Pure false-positive suppression with clear rationale comments. No logic changes. Safe to merge.
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Summary
Closes the SQL injection issue in `database-check.php` — but as a documentation/suppression PR rather than a behavior change. Net: +13 / -3 lines, 1 file touched.
Context
When #122 was filed, the file had real exposure: `$where_clauses` was concatenated unescaped into a query. The file has since been refactored — all dynamic SQL now goes through `$wpdb->prepare()` with `%s` placeholders, and the values passed are either literal pattern strings or `$wpdb->esc_like()`'d constants. No user input ever touches the query string directly.
What remained were 3 phpcs false-positives.
Suppressions added (with rationale comments)
What I did NOT change
The SQL itself. All three queries in this file already use `$wpdb->prepare()` with safe placeholder patterns. The phpcs warnings were noise, not findings.
Verification
What's still queued for v0.11
After this lands, the remaining WP.org blockers are:
Test plan
🤖 Generated with Claude Code